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CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance Surrounding  
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Allan Grogan 
While many studies have investigated excess CEO compensation, few empirical 
studies have focused on the impact of compensation inequities between top managers and 
other members of top management on managerial decision making. Even fewer to date 
have done so in the context of mergers and acquisitions. This thesis contributes to the 
domain of CEO compensation and merger and acquisitions. We find that differences in 
compensation between the CEO and the next highest paid executives are related to lower 
ownership of common equity by the CEO in a firm. In addition, we also find CEO duality 
and larger firms are also associated with larger inequities in compensation. Our 
contention is that poor governance mechanisms may lead to both poor management and 
decision making and high compensation inequities. To determine the validity of this 
claim, we regress the offer premium, abnormal returns, and the likelihood of hostility on 
unexplained inequities in compensation. We find no evidence that unexplained inequity 
influences the offer premium. In addition, we find a slightly negative effect of 
unexplained compensation on abnormal returns. Finally, we find no effect of this 






   
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction          1 
II. Background          2  
a.  Equity theory         3 
b.  Overview of compensation      3 
c.  Overview of mergers and acquisitions     5 
d.  Related research        7 
e. Introduction to narcissism      8 
f. Poor M&A decision making                10 
 
III. Hypothesis Testing Procedures and Model               11 
IV. Testing Procedures and Model                  15 
a.  Offer premium       15 
b.  Compensation inequity      15  
c.  CEO age        17 
d.  Tenure        18 
e.  Ownership of common equity     18 
f.  CEO duality       19 
g.  Firm Size        19 
h.  Institutional ownership      20 
i.  Tobin’s Q        20 
j.  Merger attitude       21 
 
V. Data and Methods         21 
 a.   Data        21 
 b.   Measurements       22 
 
VI. Results          24 
a. Summary statistics       24  
b. Regression results       28 
         
VII. Conclusion        32  
VIII. Limitations and Future Research      33 
IX. References        35 
X.  Tables         43 
XI. Appendix         56 




The central premise of this study surrounds compensation discrepancies between 
CEOs and other top executives within an organization. Although compensation 
inequalities exist at all levels of an organization, many intricate and interrelated factors 
determine how a top manager is paid. It is nearly impossible to obtain data from CEO 
participation in laboratory studies; however using secondary objective data can prove just 
as fruitful. The background or environment of this study entails equity theory, as 
advanced by Adams and Jacobson (1963a) and Adams (1965). Recent studies of CEO 
overconfidence (Malmander and Tate, 2005) in corporate investment as well as on the 
merger and acquisition (M&A) process (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Malmander and 
Tate, 2008; and John, Liu, and Taffler, 2011) and CEO narcissism (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007; Atkas, De Bodt, Bollaert, and Roll, 2011) indicate a new domain of 
research into corporate governance. This study contributes to the current literature on 
corporate governance and the decision making process by exploring more than one 
element (e.g. offer premium) in the M&A process. Our contention is that poor corporate 
governance, as manifested in part by inequities in CEO compensation relative to that of 
the next highest paid executive, leads to poor managerial decision making regarding 
M&A activity.  
This thesis is organized as follows: Section II further elaborates on the existing 
research literature concerning equity theory, CEO compensation, corporate governance as 
well as mergers and acquisitions. Section III explains the hypotheses tested while Section 
IV describes the testing procedures and models employed in this study. Section V lists 
the various sources of data and collection procedures followed by results in Section VI 
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and their interpretations. Section VII concludes with summarizing the hypotheses and 
results. Finally, Section VIII addresses the limitations of this thesis and offers direction 
for further research. 
II. Background  
a. Equity theory 
This theory is based on perceptions of an individual’s allocation of their 
outcome/input ratio relative to the outcome/input ratio of comparative others. More 
precisely, “outcome” refers to compensation received while “input” represents both 
investments placed in an exchange relationship, typically measured as time, energy, 
education, and skills of employees. In this thesis, employees refer to the next highest 
level of management. Adams (1965) contends if the individual (in this study, upper 
management) experiences a sense of inequity relative to comparative others (CEO), a 
sense of discrepancy will arise in the exchange relationship, and he will take corrective 
measures to restore equity to the situation. A less rigid conceptualization of distributive 
justice was earlier advocated by Homans (1961) who posited that an individual who 
experiences dissatisfaction may or may not correct the inequity.  
As mentioned earlier, the basis of this study does not rest with correcting 
distributive injustices, but rather to acknowledge that it may exist in firms where CEO 
compensation greatly exceeds that of subordinates. Since many upper management 
executives who experience a discrepancy are not in a position to correct any 
compensation inequalities, a more fitting construct of distributive justice advocated by 
Homans (1961) is appropriate. Concerning terminology, a caveat is necessary: given that 
inequity may or may not exist among members of an organization given discrepancies in 
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compensation, it nonetheless implies the state of not being equal in absolute terms. 
Therefore, for convenience we will refer to unequal compensation as “compensation 
inequity”. The main purpose of this study however, is not to determine the relative 
disparity between top management executives but rather to examine how compensation 
inequities at the highest levels of an organization will affect M&A decision making 
(O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal, 1988). 
b. Overview of Compensation 
CEO compensation has been a contentious issue since the mid 1980’s when 
compensation levels were found to be rising at higher rates than salaries of the average 
worker.  In a sample of the 500 largest firms in the United States (Standard and Poor’s 
500 index), the average CEO salary in 1980 was $1 million (Forbes, 2011). By 2000, this 
amount ballooned to $13.8 million. In relative terms, CEOs of these same S&P 500 firms 
in 1970 were paid a salary 25 times the average worker. This metric at the time was 
composed mostly of base salary and very little additional compensation (Murphy, 1999). 
By 1996, total compensation was reported by Murphy to exceed 200 times the average 
worker’s salary. In addition, the CEO earns approximately 50% more compensation than 
other corporate executives at the next highest level (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). The 
catalyst behind this inflated multiple is attributed to the increased usage of bonuses and 
stock option awards.  
In part response to large salaries and bonuses are less visible compensation 
schemes such as stock and option awards as advocated by agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). These compensation schemes align the 
interests of principles (e.g., owners, shareholders) with that of agents (e.g., managers). 
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Although a well-designed compensation structure may align managers’ interests with that 
of shareholders (Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, 1988), a poorly designed scheme may 
bring the unintended consequences of overconfident CEOs wishing build their empires 
through mergers and acquisitions (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). A recent study by Tosi, 
Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) examined the overall effectiveness of plans 
purporting to link equating pay to firm performance. In a meta-analytic study, they found 
that firm performance explains less than 5% of CEO compensation while firm size 
explains nearly 40% of total compensation. These findings indicate that CEOs are paid 
based on the size of the firm under their control rather than on their leadership abilities.  
Excess CEO compensation has also has been wrought with criticism from 
practitioners (Crystal, 1991) and academics (Wilhelm, 1993; Wade, O’Reilly, and 
Pollock, 2006; Harris, 2009) alike. In light of these controversial pay schemes, some 
scholars and practitioners have argued in favor of simpler pay structures. Crystal (1991) 
noted that while CEOs earn more every year, they are still compensated with larger 
salaries for mediocre or even poor performance. She suggests these top managers should 
be paid no more than 20 times the salary of the lowest-paid employee, an idea also 
proposed by J.P. Morgan in 1896 (Ellig, 2006) and Peter Drucker (1984). One possible 
solution that has arisen in recent years is to restrict CEO pay (O’Reilly and Main, 2007) 
to a flat-rate salary like those received by managers in the public sector (Frey and 
Osterloh, 2005). Recently, Dittman, Maug, and Zhang (2011) proposed restricting 
compensation by stock options since managers are increasingly rewarded for taking more 
risk at the expense of shareholders.   
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c. Overview of mergers and acquisitions  
A merger is defined by Gaughan (2007) as “a combination of two corporations 
where one corporation survives and the merged corporation goes out of existence” (p. 
12). Firms normally undertake mergers and acquisitions to accomplish strategic 
objectives such as increasing market share, pursuit of cost and revenue synergies, and to 
consolidate within an industry among other reasons (Gaugan, 2007). Mergers are 
typically conducted on friendly terms when the acquiring (bidding) firm indicates interest 
in purchasing the target firm. After a series of negotiations, management from both the 
bidding and target firm agree on the dynamics of the deal and the merger is completed 
shortly thereafter (Gaughan, 2007). In some cases however, the target firm’s management 
will refuse. If management in the acquiring firm still chooses acquire the target firm, a 
hostile takeover attempt will ensue. This is normally done with management from the 
acquiring firm appealing directly to the target firm’s shareholders to sell their shares to 
the acquiring firm, usually for a much higher price than the current market price. In both 
friendly and hostile acquisitions, the acquirer usually pays a premium to purchase stock 
in the target firm. In the latter case, however, it has been found that offer premiums are, 
on average, significantly higher (Hanouna, Sarin, and Shapiro, 2001).  
In the finance literature, one way to measure and examine firm performance 
around a recorded event such as dividend or merger announcement is with an event 
study. A concise description is given by Kothari and Warner (2008) “Event studies 
examine the behavior of firms’ stock prices around corporate events” (p. 5). The formula 
that outlines this process is given as 
Returnit = Expectedit + eit,                   (1) 
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Where, Returnit is the actual return on security (i) at time (t), Expectedit is the forecasted 
or expected return for security (i) at time (t), and eit is the ‘abnormal’ or ‘unexpected’ 
return. In event studies, we are particularly concerned with the abnormal returns 
surrounding a particular announcement date. When working with more than one 
observation, namely multiple securities around different announcement dates, we sum 
with the following equation given by 
                          (2) 
                     (3)  
Where (N) is the total number of firms, (t) is the date relative to the announcement date,  
 are the abnormal returns at relative date (t) and  are the cumulative abnormal 
returns summed from ti to tj. If the abnormal returns are significant, this suggests that 
security returns were influenced by the event in question. When measuring abnormal 
returns, different event windows are selected depending on the time frame of interest 
relative to the merger. For example, a 3-day CAR around the event window is listed as [-
1, +1] indicating the cumulative abnormal returns accrued to the acquiring or target firm. 
Other event windows can focus on abnormal returns before the announcement (i.e., [-10, 
-2]) or post announcement (i.e., [+2, +10]) depending on the study in question. 
Typical abnormal returns accrued to the acquiring firm are, on average, less than 
that of the target firm. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) found acquirer abnormal 
returns for larger firms to be less than 1% over a 3-day event window surrounding the 
announcement date. In addition, Moller et al. (2004) noted acquiring firm losses after 
1997 have substantially increased. In addition, they found public acquirers experience 
average losses on 1% over a 3-day event window. This is also confirmed in a later study 
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by Moeller et al., (2007). The previous observation regarding acquirers is completely 
opposite to the observations in reference to target firm returns. In a vast review of the 
literature of mergers and acquisitions, Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, (2008) also noted 
this phenomenon across studies. In addition, they examined M&A activity between 1980 
and 2005 and found target firm abnormal returns to average 14.6% over a 3-day event 
window. Consistent with previous studies, they also found acquiring firm abnormal 
returns to be close to zero depending on factors such firm size, method of payment, and 
merger attitude.  
d. Related Research 
Since this study focuses on poor M&A decisions as a result of weak governance, 
we will first review some recent literature to define the scope and foundation of this 
study. One of the first studies on this topic was performed by Hambrick and D'Aveni, 
(1992) to measure CEO outside the scope of M&A. Using governance metrics and 
compensation ratios relative to that of the next highest paid executive, they found firms 
with dominant CEOs were more associated with corporate bankruptcy. While they do not 
stress causality, they did find a linkage between these types of managers and 
organizational failure. In related studies, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) and Roll (1986) 
investigated CEO hubris. Hayward and Hambrick operationalized hubristic CEOs by 
incorporating factor analysis of various hubris indicators such as CEO duality, media 
praise, and compensation inequity ratios. They found hubristic CEOs tend to overpay for 
acquisitions by nearly 5% relative to non-hubristic managers. Malmandier and Tate 
(2008) also investigated CEO overconfidence. They found overconfident acquiring CEOs 
pursue more acquisitions. In addition these acquiring firms experienced lower 3-day 
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abnormal returns relative to non-overconfident managers. The authors operationalized 
overconfidence as a combination of media coverage and option holdings. Liu et al. 
(2011) investigated both acquirer and target firm CEOs in the M&A process. They define 
overconfidence as early option exercises and media portrayal. They found overconfident 
acquiring and target firm CEOs contribute to offer premiums in excess of 2% to 5% 
relative to non-overconfident CEOs and these same acquiring firm experience negative 3-
day abnormal returns.  
e. Introduction to narcissism 
In the past five years, research into narcissism has been extended from 
psychology and other social science domains into the fields of management and corporate 
governance (Judge, LePine, and Rich, 2006; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006; Chatterjee 
and Hambrick, 2007; Aktas, De Bodt, Bollaert, and Roll, 2010). Since many clinical 
definitions of narcissism are similar in meaning, we will first focus on the description 
given by Kets de Vries (1993). Then, we will describe the characteristics and actions of 
constructive and destructive components of this disorder. It will also deserve mention 
how real life cases of this personality trait manifest itself into the workplace and at the 
executive level. Finally, recent and related research on destructive narcissism and how it 
drives top managers to make poor decisions will be examined. 
Kets De Vries (1993, 2006), states that narcissism is an imbalance between 
grandiosity and helplessness sustained early in childhood or adolescence. It is normally 
activated later in life if this deficiency is not corrected in one’s youth (1993). Although 
many individuals do not fully overcome this disorder, many are able to channel and 
harness these feelings in a positive manner. This concept is known as constructive 
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narcissism (Lubit, 2002; Ronsnthal and Pittinsky, 2006). Many successful leaders and 
entrepreneurs are able to prosper in their respective positions when they exude 
confidence, poise, and inspire others, particularly by inspiring their subordinates through 
what Kets de Vries (1993) describes as self-assertion. In addition, they can exhibit 
creativity (Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006); an attribute much in demand for higher 
leadership positions. Many successful leaders as a result of constructive narcissism have 
displayed charisma (Maccoby, 2000; Rosenthal and Pettinsky, 2006; Humphreys, Zhao, 
Ingram, Gladstone, and Basham, 2010) enabling them to accede to their present positions 
of power and influence. This is also echoed by Kets de Vries and Miller (1985) arguing 
that a certain amount of narcissism is healthy for leadership positions.  
Unfortunately, many narcissists exhibit a less glamorous side of this personality 
trait in what is known as destructive or pathological narcissism (Kets de Vries, 1985; 
Lubit, 2002; Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006). The same authors describe destructive 
narcissism as (DN) a negative aspect of the narcissism construct where the leader suffers 
from grandiosity, lacks values, belittles others of lower stature, seeks excitement, seeks 
continuous reinforcement in areas they feel lacking, and exhibits a sense entitlement. All 
of these attributes are consistent with the formal definition found in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) published by the American 
Psychological Association (APA, 2000). Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006) describe actions 
of these individuals in leadership positions as being driven by egomaniacal taking 
precedence over the needs of shareholders and stakeholders alike. Often times, it is too 
late to detect and deal effectively with destructive narcissistic CEOs once he/she has 
already risen through the hierarchy of the organization to obtain the top management 
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position. As Kets de Vries (1993) cites, “…. many narcissistic people, with their need for 
power, prestige, and glamour, eventually end up in leadership positions” (p. 33). In 
addition, the author posits that traditional agency theory measures are typically 
ineffective in mitigating this behavior. 
f. Poor M&A decision making 
Narcissistic managers often satisfy their innate needs engage in “grandiose 
projects” (Cannella and Monroe 1997, p. 227). As described by Chatterjee and   
Hambrick (2007), acquisitions of large firms “are among the most visible initiatives a 
CEO can take” (p. 359). Therefore, they will strive to build their empires through 
mergers and acquisitions and it is hypothesized they will do so more than CEOs who do 
not exhibit such personality traits.  
To operationalize this construct, Chatterjee and Hambrick constructed a scale 
consisting of the following four major conceptual facets of narcissism employed by 
Emmons (1987). The four dimensions consist of the following: Exploitativeness and 
Entitlement; Leadership and Authority; Superiority and Arrogance; and Self-Absorption 
and Self-Admiration. Using unobtrusive indicators of first singular pronoun usage, 
analysis of annual reports featuring the CEOs photograph, and CEO relative 
compensation, Chatterjee and Hambrick matched those indicators with the four major 
narcissism scale elements of Emmons (1987). For example, CEO relative compensation 
corresponds with the Superiority and Arrogance as well as the Exploitativeness and 
Entitlement components of this construct. Although this thesis lacks all the unobtrusive 
indicators employed by Chatterjee and Hambrick, our use of compensation inequity is 
sufficient to capture two of the four principal elements of narcissism in their study. 
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Although the two elements of Entitlement and Superiority may be insufficient to 
completely operationalize narcissism in top managers, we feel these components are 
associated with poor managerial decision making in M&A activity in the presence of 
weak internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance. 
III. Hypotheses 
The previous section explained how excessive compensation and major 
management decisions are interrelated. While excess CEO compensation can not only 
invoke feelings of injustice with the average worker, it may create problems within upper 
management (Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock, 2006). When this occurs, a significant CEO 
pay inequity may indicate the firm is being helmed by an overconfident CEO wielding 
excessive power and influence (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992). As mentioned in the 
previous section, compensation inequity at the least may be associated with poor 
managerial decision making. We stress however that stronger governance mechanisms 
may prevent this from occurring. 
Hypothesis I. The greater the disparity in compensation between the 
acquiring firm CEO and upper management of an acquiring firm, the greater 
the share price (offer premium) paid necessary to acquire a target firm.  
As previously mentioned, compensation disparities in levels of management may 
signal a potential governance problem. In light of the large compensation increases CEOs 
have received in larger companies (Mueller, 1969; Murphy, 1999) and over time 
(Hanouna, et al., 2001), these CEOs who enjoy large compensation discrepancies could 
use M&A activity as a justification to build their empires and justify salary increases. As 
the aforementioned studies by Hayward and Hambrick, (2007) and Malmandier and Tate, 
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(2008) found overconfident CEOs to overpay for acquisitions. We postulate that elements 
of these same studies, notably CEO duality and greater compensation relative to other 
executives are associated with poor M&A decision making supporting Hypothesis I.  
Hypothesis IIa. Acquiring firms with greater disparities in compensation 
between the CEO and the next highest paid executive officer are more likely 
to experience lower abnormal returns relative to firms where compensation 
disparities are smaller.  
Hypothesis IIb. Target firms with greater disparities in compensation 
between the CEO and the next highest paid executive officer are more likely 
to experience lower abnormal returns relative to firms where compensation 
disparities are smaller.  
As mentioned earlier, acquiring firms led by overconfident CEOs have been 
associated with lower abnormal return in relation to their counterparts (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007; Atkas et al, 2011; Liu et al., 2011). We expect acquiring firms with 
higher inequities, to have lower abnormal returns when contrasted with firms having 
lower than average inequities in compensation. We also postulate lower abnormal returns 
to also be present in target firms with weak governance mechanisms and greater 
inequities. Although target firms on average have larger abnormal returns relative to the 
acquiring firm, we contend that the market will react negatively to the unexplained 
inequity in compensation of a top manager’s salary relative to other executives. Although 
one may assume the CEO of a target firm will sell for a higher price, we contend he will 
entrench himself in his respective position regardless of higher returns on the stock price. 
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Hypothesis IIIa. Acquiring firms with greater disparities in compensation 
between the CEO and the next highest paid executive officer are more likely 
to engage in hostile takeovers.  
Hypothesis IIIb.  Target firms with greater disparities in compensation 
between the CEO and the next highest paid executive officer are more likely 
to engage in hostile takeovers.  
The previous literature cited illustrates that overconfident CEOs overpay for 
acquisitions.  If acquiring firms with weak governance mechanisms allow the CEO to 
overpay for acquisitions, this can signal an attempt by the CEO to build their empire 
irrespective of their concern for shareholders (Malmandier and Tate, 2008). We contend 
that firms with weak governance mechanisms, as manifested by large compensation 
inequities, will not only overpay for acquisitions, but also engage in hostile takeovers to 
acquire firms and increase the scope of their power.  
Similar to acquiring firms, CEOs of target firms who enjoy excessive 
compensation relative to the rest of the upper management team are more likely to exude 
overconfidence and are thus more likely to entrench themselves in their positions. This 
phenomenon is known as the management entrenchment hypothesis (Gaughan, 2007, p. 
172). From a finance standpoint, top managers desire to invest in expensive endeavors 
and commit the firm’s resources to large projects. This ties the organization and its 
shareholders to the project and justifies the need for the CEO to remain with the firm and 
preside over these endeavors (Schleifer and Vishny, 1990). Although these investments 
are not always in the best interests of the firm and shareholders, it nonetheless increases 
the probability of a manager’s continued tenure. Organizational theorists and researchers 
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also approach this hypothesis in a similar vein. Walsh and Seward (1990) argue that 
“Valuing their position, many executives work to ensure their own job security” (p. 431). 
In the case of poor management or a lack of governance, CEOs will resist any attempt at 
external control (merger or hostile takeover attempts) to replace them.   
Hypothesis IVa. A target firm CEO who also occupies the chair position will 
contribute to disparities in compensation relative to other top management 
officials.  
Hypothesis IVb. An acquiring firm CEO who also occupies the chair position 
will contribute to disparities in compensation relative to other top 
management officials.  
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) contend that when the CEO occupies the position 
of chair, this is associated with weak governance mechanisms. In addition, they find a 
combined CEO/chair position is associated with increased offer premiums to acquire 
firms. When the top manager is also the chairperson, Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) 
claim “can dominate both the agenda and content of board meetings” (p. 1082). We 
contend CEO duality can therefore influence compensating committee meetings as well. 
To test for correlations of this inequity, we will include various control variables such as 
CEO age, tenure, ownership, and prior firm performance.   
IV. Testing Procedures and Model  
To formally test the aforementioned hypotheses, logistic regression is necessary 
to determine the likelihood of an acquisition occurring under friendly or hostile terms. 
The model incorporates cross-sectional indicator and control variables to account for 
other factors that may be driving the results. To determine the offer premium, ordinary 
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least squares regression (OLS) will be used in conjunction with control variables. Both 
models are listed below: 
P(y = 1) = , 
       OfferPremiumit  = B0t + B1Inequityi(t-1) + B2Controli(t-1). 
where:  
       XB, Control = Governance and control variables consisting of the following 
model: 
B0 +  B1Inequityi(t-1) + B2 Agei(t-1) + B3Tenurei(t-1) +  B4Ownershipi(t-1) + 
B4Chairi(t-1) + B5(Size)i(t-1) +   B6Outsidi(t – 1)  +  B7OutTotali(t-1)   +   
B8TobinQi(t-1)+ B9Premiumit + B10Attitudetit + eit. 
where: (i) is the variable in year (t). 
a. Offer Premium 
The offer premium, as mentioned earlier, is the final offer price paid to acquire 
the target firm’s shares relative to the price before the offer announcement. For this study, 
the pre-announcement price is the share price one month before the announcement. To 
test Hypothesis II, the dependent variable is the offer premium. The control variables 
employed in this study will account for other characteristics that may be influencing our 
results.  
b. Compensation Inequity 
This important variable will help determine in future analysis whether or not 
decisions by relatively overpaid CEOs will influence how much the firm pays for 
acquisitions, whether or not the CEO wishes build his empire, and whether or not the 
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acquisition is friendly or non-friendly This variable is constructed by the following 
formula: 
Ineq1 = CIa/(1 + CIa); 
Ineq2 = CIb/(1 + CIb); 
where; 
CIa = CEO compensation/next highest compensated executive; 
CIb = CEO compensation/ average of next highest executive. 
By dividing each compensation differential by itself and adding one in the 
denominator, we construct a continuous scale ranging from zero to one with zero 
indicating the CEO earning no compensation to one reflecting larger salaries relative to 
other top managers. This also circumvents any problem with extreme values occurring 
when the CEO is paid a one dollar salary and management is paid full compensation or, 
as the case of the CEO of Ebix International, who earns seven times the firm’s President. 
In addition, it is preferable to measure in terms of relative compensation rather than 
absolute differences since larger firms may suppress the effects of substantial 
compensation inequities experienced by smaller organizations. Table I lists the 
description and measurement of compensation inequities for acquiring and target firms in 
our sample. Variables CI(1) and CI(2) measure cash compensation of the CEO relative to 
that of the next highest paid and the average of next highest paid executives respectively 
while variables CI(3) – CI(4) employ various measures of option compensation. When 
measuring options compensation, we must exercise caution since the value may vary 
among and to a lesser extent within firms. This is due to some option awards being given 
in tranches, that is, at different dates and/or strike prices. For example, a CEO may have 
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award periods in January, June, and December for different amounts. Obtaining an 
accurate value is further complicated when each installment has a different exercise price. 
Therefore, at years end, some or all option grants may expire out of the money 
(worthless). Since there is greater homogeneity within the same firm relative than to 
others, we prefer to use option value as a relative measure rather than as an absolute 
measure.   
In this study, we are not directly measuring the association between inequity and 
M&A activity (e.g., offer premium, abnormal returns), but rather the inequity that is 
unaccounted for in observable firm and CEO characteristics. To begin, we regress the 
compensation inequities of CEOs on governance and firm control variables. We then 
perform regressions of hostility, abnormal returns, and offer premium on the unexpected 
inequities (the residual terms from the previous equation) and governance variables from 
this model to determine their influence on the M&A process. This procedure was 
performed by Yermack (2006) who used a model to determine abnormal compensation. 
He then regressed the dollar amount of personal aircraft usage against these residual 
terms and found significant evidence that perquisite consumption was explained by 
abnormal compensation.    
c. CEO Age 
Younger managers have been found to be more likely to experience a hostile 
takeover during their tenure than their older counterparts (Morck et al., 1988a). 
Therefore, CEO age is associated with the likelihood of a turnover in a firm’s 
management surrounding M&A activity. According to Morck and colleagues, younger 
managers were found to have greater independence from a firm’s board of directors 
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giving them greater latitude in decision making. Therefore, a negative coefficient will 
indicate older CEOs are less likely to refuse. An insignificant coefficient will support the 
contention that CEO age is not driving the results. To measure this variable, we record 
the age of the CEO one year prior to the announcement as listed in form 14DEF from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
d. Tenure 
As with CEO age, tenure of a top manager represents the degree of involvement 
in the firm and the manager’s ability to exert his influence over a firms’ board of 
directors (Mace 1971; Hill and Phan 1991; Hermlain and Weisbach, 1998). In addition, 
longer serving CEOs who desire to remain with the firm will resist a merger or takeover. 
We determine tenure as the length of time the top manager has been in his respective 
position rounded to the nearest year. This coefficient is expected to be negative indicating 
that longer serving CEOs wish to retain their title.  
e. Ownership of common equity 
            Managerial ownership of common stock has been found to increase a firm’s 
market valuation (Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) by 
aligning the financial interests CEOs with that of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In addition, the greater the stake a top manager owns in their firm can also 
decrease the likelihood of a tender offer (Stulz, 1988). For these reasons, we include the 
percentage ownership of common stock of the CEO in the firm one year prior to the 
merger announcement date. DEF 14A statements often include headings such as “amount 
and nature of beneficial ownership” and “acquirable options on stock exercisable within 
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60 days” while others combine both metrics as an aggregate amount. For consistency, we 
add both of these amounts in cases when it is listed separately.  
f. CEO duality 
When CEOs also occupy the chairperson position of a board of directors, this is 
known as CEO duality. Although the consolidated CEO/chair position can function as a 
unity of command, it can also serve to entrench powerful managers in their positions 
(Mallette and Fowler, 1992). Boards of directors with strong governance mechanisms 
prefer to separate the two positions (Norton, 1991: Mallette and Fowler, 1992). For 
purposes of measurement, CEO duality will be listed as an indicator variable and will 
receive one if the CEO is also the chairperson. 
g. Firm Size 
Controlling for firm size studies on compensation and governance is common in 
the field of finance and management. Hill and Phan (1991), have included this variable to 
omit any possible effects of size influencing results. Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny 
(1988a) they find that larger firms are harder to acquire due their large market 
capitalizations and/or access to takeover defenses such as stock repurchases and the 
ability to initiate expensive lawsuits. Conversely, Cotter and Zenner (1994) find larger 
firms experience a greater incidence of tender offers than do smaller ones. They attribute 
this to larger managerial ownership in smaller firms where ownership is more 
concentrated relative to larger firms. This will be defined as the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets. We expect this coefficient to be positive indicating larger firms have 
larger inequities.  
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h. Institutional ownership 
As the CEO gains stature and power in an organization, she will influence board 
composition as her tenure increases (Mace, 1971; Hill and Phan, 1991; Weisbach, 1993). 
This includes nominating subordinates and and/or executives supportive of the top 
manager. Since this study does not directly measure the size of a firm’s board of directors 
or director independence, we will use institutional ownership to proxy for outsider 
monitoring. In a similar vein, institutional owners have a vested interest in the overall 
profitability, governance and decision making strategies of the firm (Chaganti and 
Damanpour, 1991). These large institutional shareholders may meet regularly with boards 
of directors and CEOs and can influence organizational policy and strategy. They can act 
to aid dissident investors about firm direction, governance, and overall strategy with their 
presence (Pound, 1992). In cases where ownership is highly concentrated, Holderness 
and Sheehan (1988) found that large shareholders exceed their capacities of monitoring 
and in fact lead the organization. At the other extreme, it has been found that institutional 
ownership of as little as 1% is sufficient to influence decisions (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Pound, 1992). In this study, we include total institutional ownership of stakeholders who 
each own at least than 5% of a firm’s common stock. As an additional proxy, we also 
include the total number of institutional blockholders per firm.   
i. Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is formally defined as the market value of a firm divided by the 
replacement cost of its assets. Obtaining the denominator of this ratio is cumbersome 
since the true asset replacement values of many firms are only known by management. 
Instead, we determine Tobin’s Q using the definition of Chung and Pruitt (1994) who 
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determine the numerator as the market value of assets plus preferred stock and current 
liabilities minus current assets plus the book value of long-term debt. This figure is then 
divided by total assets. Morck et al. (1989) have found that firms with lower Tobin Q 
ratios are more likely to be acquired in a hostile takeover. Since this is often used as a 
measure of firm value, we also expect lower Tobin Q ratios for target firms experiencing 
a hostile takeover.    
j. Merger attitude 
The merger attitude in an event study is normally classified as friendly or non-
friendly. When it is not possible to conduct a negotiated transaction on friendly terms, an 
acquiring firm may resort to a tender offer or a hostile takeover (Gaughan, 2007). In this 
study, the merger attitude will be operationalized by an indicator variable that takes a one 
if the offer is classified in SDC as “hostile” or “unsolicited”.   
V.  Methods  
a. Data  
To determine compensation inequalities within organizations it is necessary to 
obtain individual firm data. Our sample is restricted to publically listed U.S. firms that 
either experienced a friendly merger or hostile takeover attempt between 1995 and 2010. 
All merger and acquisition data are provided by Securities and Data Corporation, a 
database including merger information, offer premia, and merger outcomes in a 
downloadable Excel format. Compensation data for CEOs and other top executives was 
obtained from DEF 14A proxy filings from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) for each firm year. In addition, CEO age and tenure information was also obtained 
from SEC proxy filings. All financial metrics and attributes such as target and acquirer 
   
22 
 
market capitalization, outstanding liabilities and shares outstanding were obtained from 
Compustat.  
The initial SDC sample included 20,695 mergers and acquisitions. We further 
restricted our sample to acquiring firms listed in Compustat further reducing the sample 
to 5,029 acquisitions with financial data. It was also necessary to discard nearly 4,500 
share repurchases classified as acquisitions leaving our sample with 580 observations. 
We then excluded all financial and utility firms (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999) in 
addition to acquisitions of subsidiaries. Finally, we limited our sample to acquisitions of 
targets greater than $1 billion in enterprise value in constant 2005 dollars
1
. Larger 
mergers are found to influence the acquiring firm’s corporate governance (Wang and Xie; 
2007) and invoke managerial hubris (Moeller et al., 2004) relative to that of smaller 
targets. In addition, Moeller and colleagues (2004) found the average transaction value of 
larger acquirers to be $450 million
2
. Our final sample included compensation data for 259 





Some firms in our sample included CEOs who either resigned or retired in mid-
year of their tenure. For consistency, we employed a strict classification. We did not 
include a former CEO as the top manager if he relinquished his position before July of 
                                                          
1 Since some variations in nominal enterprise value exceeded 30% across this period when contrasted 
against real enterprise value (i.e., $770 million enterprise value for Firm A in 1996 is equal to $1 billion 
in 2010 dollars) we chose to normalize our sample controlling for inflation. 
2 Originally, our sample included all targets greater than $500 million in enterprise value. Given the 
daunting task of hand collecting compensation data for more than 1,200 firms, we limited our sample to 
targets greater than $1 billion. 
3
 Many of these firms in our sample did not have compensation data one or even two years before the 
announcement. In this case, they were omitted from our sample. 
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the year preceding the acquisition. For example, if a CEO resigned in June of yeart-1, then 
his replacement was listed as the acting CEO.  
 The rationale for doing this was to determine who was in charge six months 
before and after the merger. In either case, if the CEO was not considered the acting top 
manager, his compensation data was still included for determining compensation 
inequities. In limited instances where the firm experienced more than two CEOs in a 
given year (i.e., ImClone Systems), the firm was excluded from our sample. To determine 
compensation, a set of common metrics spanning different disclosure rules were 
employed. This was done since DEF 14F proxy statements after 2007 were 
fundamentally different from previously reporting formats. Although salary and bonus 
(base) compensation data were identical for both reporting formats, the post-2007 
reporting format included an aggregate value for all stock and option awards in relation to 
previous statements being less organized. Figures I – III illustrate the different methods 
for EMC Corporation, a firm used in our sample. 
In some instances, the CEO was paid a sum of $1 as a symbolic gesture although 
they were compensated by option grants. To control for this an indicator variable was 
used if their cash compensation was less than $100. This was of limited occurrence, 
however it was necessary to control for.  
Given the nature of research in corporate governance and CEO compensation, 
issues of spurious correlations or causality may arise particularly with the association of 
board characteristics or CEO compensation and firm performance (Hermlain and 
Weisbach, 1998, 2003). We acknowledge this is a potential problem, particularly when 
regressing CEO compensation inequities on governance and control variables. Spurious 
   
24 
 
correlation may abound when claiming CEO compensation is a result of governance 
characteristics. Therefore, simultaneous equation methods or lagging variables may 
correct for this problem (Hermlain, 1991). We focus on the latter option since obtaining 
data from the year prior is less cumbersome. Regardless, we acknowledge that lagging 
data for only one year may not suffice. When interpreting our results, we will focus less 
on causality and more on correlations. Finally, multicollinearity among control variables 
in this study was not significant since no values had any correlations greater than 0.61. 
All regression analysis in this study were performed with EViews and SPSS.   
VI. Results 
a. Summary statistics  
Figure IV illustrates the frequency of all mergers and acquisitions in our sample. 
Consistent with the wave of mergers that occurred during the late 1990’s, the majority of 
our sample is found within those years. In addition, our sample exhibits increasing M&A 
activity after 2005, consistent with a burgeoning sixth wave of mergers.  
Tables II - V report summary statistics for CEO, governance, and control 
variables and their respective differences between acquirer and target sizes. Examining 
Table II in greater detail, CEO mean and median age for acquiring firms for friendly and 
non-friendly acquisitions is 55 consistent with a recent study by Yim (2010) who found 
similar results for a sample of S&P 500 firms between 1992 and 2007. We find mean 
target age CEO age is significantly lower at 53.6 years of age as confirmed Panel A of 
Table IV. Concerning tenure, mean and median CEO tenure for acquiring firms is 5.1 and 
3.0 years respectively while target firm CEOs have significantly shorter tenure at 5.1 and 
3.0 years respectively. This is also validated by a recent study by Kaplan and Minton 
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(2006) who examined large U.S.-based firms between 1992 and 2005 who found average 
tenure to be 6.1 years taking into account both internal and external turnover. When 
examining ownership of common equity by a firm’s top manager, mean and median CEO 
ownership is statistically greater among target firms (3.1%) than acquirers (2.2%). This is 
consistent with Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) who found the top manager of an 
organization owning 2.7% of a firm’s equity when examining Fortune 500 firms.  
We then examine CEO duality. We find acquiring firm top managers are also the 
chairperson in 70% of our sample and are 20% more likely to hold both positions than 
target firms as shown by Tables II and IV respectively. This is also consistent with 
Brickley et al. (1997) who found an 80% incidence of CEOs having a consolidated chair 
position. Also in our sample, we find no difference in CEO duality between friendly and 
hostile acquisitions among acquiring and target firms. In our sample, we find mean and 
median salary for acquiring firms to be $941 and $900 thousand respectively. This varies 
significantly within bidding firms with friendly CEOs earning an average of $19 
thousand more than their non-friendly counterparts. Contrasted against target firms, we 
find acquiring firm CEOs earn $350 thousand more in average salary and $938 more in 
average bonus pay relative to target firms. When examining managerial compensation in 
conjunction with firm size (market capitalization and total assets) in Panel A. Table III, 
we find that CEOs of larger firms are compensated more than smaller ones, in accordance 
with Tosi et al. (2000) who found firm size to primarily determine compensation over 
firm performance. Firm performance will be addressed in subsequent sections.  
In our sample, we find mean compensation inequity among acquiring firms range 
from 0.572 to 0.668. Figures V and VI graphically depict the mean distribution for 
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compensation inequity 1 for acquiring and target firms indicating a right-skewed 
distribution for values ranging from 0.00 to 0.944
4
. We chose to include mean rather than 
median inequities in order to capture the full spectrum ranging from very small to large 
relative compensation paid to CEOs. Referring to Table II, the mean value for acquirer 
inequity 1 is 0.593. When reversing the transformation, this indicates the CEO earns 46% 
more cash salary than the next highest paid executive. When examining the reverse 
transformed value of inequity 2, we find the CEO earning an average of 102% more than 
the average of the next highest paid executives. In addition, we also find for all mean and 
the majority of median compensation inequities is larger for acquiring firms. With the 
exception of inequities 5 and 6 (options value) compensation inequities across friendly 
and non-friendly are similar.  
Panels C and D of Table III also examine the percentage of stock used to finance 
the merger and the offer premiums. We find stock used in 47% of all mergers in our 
sample. In addition, we find a significantly greater percentage of stock for friendly 
mergers than for non-friendly. This is consistent with the literature that finds acquirer 
hostile takeovers are less likely to offer stock as a form of payment (Gaughan, 2007).  
Concerning offer premia, we also find the one day, one week, and one month offer 
premiums are significantly larger for non-friendly acquisitions than for unfriendly ones
5
. 
This is consistent with the literature that finds target management extracts a higher 
premium in hostile takeovers (Gaughan, 2007).  
                                                          
4
 We also examine other inequity distributions and find similar right-skewed curves. 
5 We focus on median rather than mean offer premiums due to the presence of outlying observations in our 
sample. 
   
27 
 
When examining abnormal returns, we find that mean (median) acquirer CARs 
surrounding to the [-1, +1] event window to be -2.1% (-1.1%), consistent with Moeller et 
al., (2004, 2007) who found larger firms to experience negative returns. Across our 
sample of acquiring firms, we find no difference between friendly and non-friendly 
acquisition abnormal returns with the exception of the post-event period of [+2, +15] 
exhibiting smaller negative returns for friendly mergers. Concerning returns to target 
firms, they accrue mean (median) 3-day CARs of 26.8% (19.6%). This is greater than the 
control sample of Betton et al., (2008) who found lower average target returns for larger 
firms. We also find no significance differences in abnormal returns between friendly and 
non-friendly acquisitions among target firms.     
Finally, we examine both acquiring and target firm inequities by partitioning each 
governance and firm variables above and below their average compensation ratios. For 
acquiring firms, older CEOs to have higher inequities in compensation for inequity 1 as 
determined by salary and bonus over that of the next highest compensated executive. We 
also find CEOs with larger inequities owning approximately 1.7% of a firm’s common 
equity. This is significantly smaller than CEOs below the average owning over 3.0%. 
From an agency viewpoint, we find CEOs may be better aligned with the firm if they are 
paid similar salaries to that of other top management subordinates. We also find that 
higher compensated CEOs relative to other executives occupy the chair position more 
frequently. Concerning Tobin’s Q, we find higher values associated with lower 
inequities. Given this evidence, we can claim that acquiring firms with poorer 
management and governance have higher paid managers relative to that of the next 
highest executive. Concerning abnormal returns, we find no significance among inequity. 
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Examining target firms, we find significantly higher instances in inequity when the CEO 
also occupies the chair position. Overall, these firms have greater homogeneity in overall 
executive compensation than acquiring firms.  
b. Regression results 
We now extend our focus to regression data. Tables VII and VIII report results 
that regress acquirer and target inequities on governance and firm control variables. In 
examining Table VII, we find that CEO age is positively related with larger inequities for 
inequity 1 while ownership is negatively related across all models. This implies the 
greater ownership of common stock the CEO owns the smaller difference in 
compensation relative to other top management executives
6
. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) weak governance mechanisms are associated with a smaller managerial 
ownership. In this study, we conjecture that weak governance is associated with 
inequities in compensation. As mentioned in earlier sections, we do not imply causality 
but rather association given potential problems with endogenity. We also find CEO 
duality is positively related to inequity implying more powerful CEOs have larger 
inequity in compensation. In addition, we also find a significant and negative relation 
between inequity and prior firm performance when controlling for recession. Finally, 
firm size, proxied by market capitalization and total assets is positively related to inequity 
while assets are negatively related. To determine why these coefficients both measuring 
firm size had different coefficients; we examined their correlations of their natural log 
between these variables and found an insignificant but negative correlation of -0.09. 
                                                          
6 In separate but unreported regressions, we also tested ownership for the presence of a curvilinear 
relationship by squaring this variable and found a significant and negative variable for only one of the four 
models for acquiring firms only. Due to a lack of consistency across all models, we omitted this curvilinear 
result. 
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Consistent with other studies that employ market capitalization as a proxy for firm size, 
we feel this is a better and more representative measure since investors and market 
analysis more often report this measure. Our results are also consistent with Tosi et al. 
(2000) who found that CEO compensation is not based on prior firm performance but 
rather on firm size (market capitalization). In this thesis, we find similar results. When 
implying that compensation inequity increases, we claim CEO salary is increasing 
relative other executives rather than his pay decreases at the expense of subordinates
7
. In 
summary, CEO compensation for acquiring firms is related to their size and is a result of 
negative stock returns. Given the CEO is the ultimate decision maker of a firm, as 
evidenced by the frequency of also occupying the chair position, compensation inequity 
is associated with poor leadership. 
Table VIII examines target firms under the same circumstances. We find mixed 
results for increased tenure and inequity and a mostly significant negative relation 
between ownership and inequity
8
. As with acquiring firms, CEO duality is found to 
increase inequity. Finally, we find recessionary periods are negatively related to salary 
and inequity increases. This can be a sign of altruistic top managers who do not increase 
their salary at the expense of their subordinates during economic hardships. We find 
overall a greater percentage of variation is explained in Table VII than Table VI as 
indicated in a higher adjusted R
2
. Since larger firms have greater exposure to public 
attention and are scrutinized more closely by analysts, investors, and even researchers, 
we contend that latent variables not accounted for in our model may explain more 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
7 In a separate study outside of the scope of this thesis, we also collected post acquisition compensation 
data and found CEO compensation increases one year after the acquisition. 
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variation concerning acquiring firms. On a final note, we excluded the variable for the 
total number of blockholders due extremely high multicollineatiry with the variable 
measuring total ownership of outside blockholders. Overall, Hypothesis IVa and IVb are 
fully supported. 
We next examine abnormal returns and regress them on the residuals from Tables 
VI and VII. In selecting the abnormal inequities (residual terms), we chose the second 
model from the aforementioned tables. We choose these particular models since they 
included market capitalization in determining each regression. In addition, we wanted to 
measure CEO compensation relative to the next highest paid rather than the average of 
next highest paid executives to be consistent with the literature. 
To begin, we selected an estimation period of -125 to -46 days prior to the actual 
event and used an equally weighted market index for our evaluating our sample. Contrary 
to our contention and Hypothesis IIa we find abnormal inequity does not influence 
abnormal returns for any of the studied event windows for acquiring firms. This is 
contrary to a lower abnormal return found by Malmandier and Tate (2008) who examined 
overconfident CEOs. In event windows [-15, -2] we find payment by stock increases 
abnormal returns, however only to a very small extent. For event window [-1, +1] we find 
CEO duality increases returns as well as payment in stock. Finally, in period [+2, +15], 
we find a small but significant coefficient. Perhaps this lack of significance rests with 
abnormal returns being indistinguishable from zero. When shifting to target firms in 
Table VIII, we first examine window [-15, -2]. We find abnormal inequities decrease the 
returns while CEO duality increases them. In addition, we find friendly mergers increase 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8
 We did not use total assets as a proxy for firm size due limited data provided by Compustat. Instead, we 
used market capitalization and found similar results as with acquiring firms.  
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target abnormal returns. For event period [+2, +15], abnormal or excess compensation 
increases abnormal returns along with CEO duality. Finally, we examined thee 3-day 
event window surrounding the announcement date and found no significance, contrary to 
Manmandier and Tate (2008). Our only interpretation of positive abnormal inequity 
decreasing the CAR pre-announcement and increasing it post-announcement can be 
attributed to market sentiment. After the merger announcement, the market may have 
positive expectations about the likelihood the deal will be completed regardless of any 
sentiment toward the CEO or management of the target firm. Although the coefficient for 
the pre-announcement period relative to the post-announcement abnormal returns is 
larger, it isn’t possible to tell the overall direction. In summary, we do not find support 
for Hypothesis IIa, however Hypothesis IIb is partially supported. 
Focusing our attention on the offer premium in Table X, we first observe that 
across all models, abnormal inequity does not influence premia. We do find however that 
bidder size decreases the one day, one week, and one month premium. We also find that 
across all models, the offer premium increases when the CEO of the acquiring firm is 
also the chairperson. This is consistent with Hayward and Hambrick (1997) who found 
consolidated CEO and chairperson position to moderate the relationship between CEO 
hubris and increased offer premiums. Finally, we find that friendly mergers actually 
increase the premium paid, contrary to Hanouna et al. (2001) who find hostile takeovers 
are associated with higher premiums. When comparing to similar studies on narcissism 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) and hubris (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), we find no 
evidence the component of compensation inequity influences offer the offer premium in 
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M&A activity. Overall, we do not find support for Hypothesis I that acquiring firm 
compensation inequities decrease the offer premium.  
Our final examination of inequity culminates with the likelihood of hostility. 
Hypothesis IIIa and IIIb contend that acquiring and target firm CEOs who have larger 
compensation relative to that of other executives are more likely to be involved in hostile 
takeovers than friendly mergers. Table XI reports the results for acquiring and target 
firms. Examining the abnormal inequity coefficient, we find no evidence that it increases 





This study investigated CEO compensation relative to that of other executives 
within acquiring and target firms surrounding M&A activity. We argued that large 
relative inequities for acquiring firm CEOs are associated with lower ownership of 
common equity, CEO duality, and firm size. We also found compensation and inequity is 
negatively related to negative stock returns. These findings as a whole suggest inequity is 
related to poor governance and is manifested by poor leadership. We posited this in turn 
will cause poor M&A decisions. Our results were mixed in this regard. We claimed 
inequity causes negative acquirer and target abnormal returns; however this hypothesis 
was not supported. In addition, we found no support for inequity influencing the offer 
premium to acquire firms, nor do we find it ascribed to the probability of a hostile 
takeover. Our last contention that inequity is associated with CEO duality is fully 
supported. Perhaps limiting the sample to only large firms and focusing on a period 
                                                          
9
 In other unreported regressions, we included different control variables that yielded similar insignificant 
results.  
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spanning 15 years may not fully capture any meaningful results. Similar studies focused 
on a smaller time period (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) or on a particular industry 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). Perhaps, our sample size is too small when 
encompassing a time period of this magnitude. Malmandier and Tate (2008) found 
significant results when using a large sample of 477 firms in their study. Finally, our 
concept of poor decision making may have contributed to these inconclusive results. 
Aforementioned studies comparing other studies, notably Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) and Hayward and Hambrick (1997) operationalized narcissism and hubris 
respectively by using multiple indicators to define their constructs. In our case, we were 
limited to the amount of available qualitative to construct multiple indicators of this 
construct. This may in turn limit our ability to differentiate between CEOs who make 
poor decisions to those who do not from our sample. 
VII. Limitations and future research 
This study does not attempt to develop or even test new theory. It does however 
attempt to explain the underlying reasons surrounding poor corporate governance leading 
to poor managerial decision making. Since non-public firms seldom supply information 
that is not required by law, this will limit the scope of this study to public firms. Although 
U.S. companies compensate executives with greater compensation relative to any other 
country (Gaughan, 2007), this study lacks a comparison of other compensation practices 
in the world. In addition, many firms in the databases mentioned earlier have missing or 
sporadically filled datasets that require discarding many observations, further limiting the 
sample even after hand collection.  
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Future research could place a greater emphasis on the causes of inequity by 
focusing outside of mergers and acquisition activity to study the overall tenure of a CEO 
during their time in office. Inequity in compensation not only yielded our most significant 
findings, it also transcends merger and acquisition activity into the broader domain of 
corporate governance and executive compensation. Nonetheless, this initial study 
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Description and measurement of compensation inequities for acquiring and target 
firms, involved in a merger or acquisition where target was greater than one billion 
dollar in enterprise value: 1996 - 2010.  
Panel A: Description of compensation variables           
Variable   Description              
SALARY  The fiscal year dollar value of the base salary earned by the 
executive in question 
BONUS  The fiscal year dollar value of bonus and/or cash compensation 
earned by the executive in question 
SARS  Securities underlying options in fiscal year in question 
FIVE PERCENT   Potential realizable value of option awards at five percent annual 
increase in stock price  
Panel B: Description of compensation Inequities           
Variable   Description             
CI(1)  CEO salary plus bonus divided by that of the next highest paid 
executive 
CI(2)  CEO salary plus bonus divided by that of the average of the next 
highest paid executives 
CI(3)  SARS of the CEO divided by that of the next highest paid executive 
CI(4)  SARS of the CEO divided by that of the average of the next highest 
paid executives 
CI(5)  Potential realizable value of option awards at five percent annual 
increase in stock price of the CEO over that of the next highest paid 
executive    
CI(6)   Potential realizable value of option awards at five percent annual 
increase in stock price of the CEO over that of the next highest paid 
executive    
Panel C: Measurement of compensation inequities 
Variable   Measurement             
Inequity 1 
 
CI(1)/(1 + CI(1)) 
      Inequity 2 
 
CI(2)/(1 + CI(3)) 
      Inequity 3 
 
CI(3)/(1 + CI(3)) 
      Inequity 4 
 
CI(4)/(1 + CI(4)) 
      Inequity 5 
 
CI(5)/(1 + CI(5)) 
      Inequity 6   CI(6)/(1 + CI(6))             
Compensation variables are obtained from SEC proxy statement DEF 14A (pre-2007) reporting format. 




Summary statistics for acquiring and target firms involved in either a merger or tender offer exceeding one billion dollars in 
enterprise value one year prior to the announcement date: 1996 - 2010 
CEO AGE is defined as the current age of the CEO one year prior to the merger announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
CEO was listed as the board chairman one year prior to the announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of common stock owned by the CEO one 
year prior to the announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their respective position based on year prior to 
announcement. MARKET CAP is firm's market capitalization (in millions) one year prior to announcement and is determined by the product of common shares 
outstanding and the year-end closing price of a firm's common stock. ASSETS is defined as the value of long-term total assets on a firm's balance sheet (in 
millions) one year prior to announcement. TOBIN'S Q is estimated as a firm's market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current liabilities divided by total 
assets one year prior to announcement. BLOCK TOTAL is defined as the total outside ownership of blockholders who own greater than five percent of a firm's 
common stock. BLOCKHOLDERS is the total amount of outside blockholders who own a firm's common stock. OFFER PREMIUM is defined as the offer price 
made to the target firm divided by the current share price one day, one week, and one month before the announcement minus one. PCTOFSTOCK is defined as 
the percentage of stock used to finance the transaction. ACQUIRER [-15, -2], [-1, +1], [+2, +15] and TARGET [-15, -2], [-1, +1], [+2, +15] consist of the cumulative 
abnormal return event windows using a value-weighted index and observation period of -125, -46 days prior to announcement.    
Panel A: Acquiring firm                          
 
Total (n = 259)______________ 
 
Friendly (n = 224)____________ 
 
Non-friendly (n = 35)_________        F – NF___ 
 
Mean Median St. dev   Mean Median St. dev 
 





MARKET CAP  48,906.383 15,339.258 83,415.816 
 
49,445.738 15,766.905 63,623.382 
 
47,807.822 8,592.541 85,204.518 *** *** 
ASSETS  29,305.012 10,482.000 54,622.700 
 
31,190.412 10,533.750 57,777.339 
 
17,337.870 8,900.000 22,868.461 
 
** 
TOBIN'S Q 2.241 1.631 2.657 
 
2.225 1.168 2.612 
 
2.293 1.809 2.960   
BLOCK TOTAL 0.147 0.107 1.522 
 
0.145 0.107 1.568 
 
0.165 0.124 1.712  *** 
BLOCKHOLDERS 1.654 1.000 0.156 
 
1.609 1.000 1.500 
 
1.969 1.500 0.158  ** 
Panel B: Target firm     (n = 212)      (n = 174)     (n = 26) 
 
  
MARKET CAP  3,996.605 13,16.350 9,287.790 
 
3,404.485 1,205.759 7,890.668 
 
8,223.568 1,906.710 15,621.740 *** *** 
 
(n = 80) 
   
(n = 68) 
   
(n = 15) 
    
ASSETS  4,204.449 887.400 9,926.945 
 
4,296.501 811.172 10,010.020 
 
5,556.012 1,700.000 9,980.229   
TOBIN'S Q 1.87 1.266 2.041 
 
1.916 1.289 2.124 
 
1.714 1.251 1.600   
              









(n = 211) 
   
(n = 174) 
   
(n = 25) 
    
BLOCK TOTAL 0.478 0.216 1.651 
 
0.493 0.208 1.568 
 
0.339 0.271 0.231 *** ** 
BLOCKHOLDERS 2.254 2.000 3.094 
 
2.413 2.000 3.278 
 
3.525 4.000 2.089 ** 
 
Panel C: Payment     (n = 226)       (n = 195)     
 
(n = 29)         
PCT. OF STOCK 44.045 40.500 41.650 
 
47.006 45.050 42.116 
 
29.854 0.000 34.150 * 
  
Panel D: Offer premium (n = 243) 
 
  (n=215)   
  
(n = 28)   
   
ONE DAY 35.887 29.270 34.000 
 
35.104 28.690 33.918 
 
46.584 38.819 33.980 ** ** 
ONE WEEK 39.266 32.150 36.507 
 
37.970 31.413 36.961 
 
48.358 42.945 33.378 ** ** 
ONE MONTH 43.011 37.120 38.261   42.124 35.171 39.168 
 
48.840 43.226 32.479 * * 
Panel E: Returns        (n = 211) 
   
(n = 180) 
   
(n = 31) 
    
ACQUIRER [-15, -2] -0.002 -0.006 0.085 
 
-0.002 -0.005 0.085 
 
-0.005 -0.016 0.082   
ACQUIRER [-1, +1] -0.021 -0.011 0.070 
 
-0.021 -0.010 0.073 
 
-0.021 -0.019 0.051   
ACQUIRER [+2, +15] -0.006 -0.012 0.086 
 
-0.005 -0.009 0.087 
 
-0.029 -0.037 0.078 *  
TARGET [-15, -2] 0.055 0.045 0.185 
 
0.053 0.043 0.191 
 
0.067 0.068 0.150   
TARGET [-1 +1] 0.268 0.196 0.374 
 
0.276 0.198 0.394 
 
0.228 0.184 0.218   
TARGET [+2, +15] 0.085 0.013 0.286 
 
0.085 0.008 0.303 
 





***indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 




Summary statistics of governance variables for acquiring and target firms involved in either a merger or tender offer exceeding 
one billion dollars in enterprise value prior to announcement date: 1996 - 2010.  
CEO AGE is defined as the current age of the CEO one year prior to the merger announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been 
in their respective position based on year prior to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of common stock owned by the CEO one year prior 
to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO was listed as the board chairman one year prior to the 
announcement. SALARY is defined as the fiscal year dollar value of the base salary earned by the executive in question (in millions). BONUS is the fiscal year 
dollar value of bonus and/or cash compensation earned by the executive in question (in millions). INEQUITY 1 - 6 are the compensation inequity ratios CIi/(1 + 
CIi) as described further in Table I. 
Panel A: Acquiring firm                           
 
Total (n = 258)_______________ 
 
Friendly (n =224)__________ 
 
Non-friendly (n =34)__________ 
 
(F - NF)___________ 
Variable Mean Median St. dev   Mean Median St. dev   Mean Median St. dev   t-test Sign-rank 
CEO AGE 54.790 55.000 6.653 
 
54.709 55.000 6.712 
 
55.250 56.500 6.580 
 
-0.541 -1.500 
TENURE 5.114 3.000 5.845  5.161 3.000 5.073  4.270 2.500 4.854 
 
0.846 0.500 
OWNERSHIP 2.220 0.453 0.451 
 
2.121 0.422 5.072 
 
2.947 0.778 6.072 
 
-0.826 -0.356 
CHAIR 0.695 1.000 0.461 
 
0.692 1.000 0.461 
 
0.689 1.000 0.471 
 
0.003 0.000 
SALARY  940.768 900.000 492.372 
 
941.785 900.000 498.279 
 
922.450 818.750 1,266.625 
 
19.335*** 81.250*** 
BONUS  1,450.391 700.000 1,983.360 
 
1,470.677 698.582 2,059.937 
 
1,370.368 965.341 1,790.687 
 
100.309* -266.759 
INEQUITY 1 0.593 0.629 0.141 
 
0.596 0.612 0.142 
 
0.595 0.634 0.169 
 
0.001 -0.022 
INEQUITY 2  0.668 0.693 0.121   0.665 0.693 0.122   0.670 0.697 0.160   -0.005 -0.004 
  (n = 172)       (n = 151)       (n = 22)       
  
INEQUITY 3 0.561 0.625 0.261 
 
0.567 0.612 0.255 
 
0.525 0.612 0.312 
 
0.042* 0.000 
INEQUITY 4  0.650 0.733 0.272 
 
0.655 0.733 0.265 
 
0.613 0.725 0.333 
 
0.042* 0.008 
INEQUITY 5 0.572 0.625 0.261 
 
0.576 0.612 0.253 
 
0.534 0.698 0.327 
 
0.042** -0.086* 
INEQUITY 6 0.658 0.735 0.267   0.650 0.733 0.257   0.609 0.742 0.341   0.041** -0.009* 
Panel B: Target Firm                           
        (n = 212)       (n = 189)       (n = 22)           
CEO AGE 53.689 54.000 7.986 
 
53.557 54.000 8.053 
 
54.389 55.000 7.761 
 
-0.832 -1.000 
TENURE 5.119 3.000 5.859 
 
5.517 3.000 5.879 
 
4.272 2.500 4.968 
 
1.245 0.500 
   
47 
 
OWNERSHIP 3.100 1.357 5.815 
 
3.198 1.298 6.037 
 
1.825 1.581 2.180 
 
1.373 -0.283 
CHAIR 0.486 0.000 0.507 
 
0.580 1.000 0.495 
 
0.483 0.000 0.509 
 
0.097 1.000 
SALARY  590.758 522.590 324.426 
 
577.019 511.300 312.613 
 
712.725 754.609 410.238 
 
-135.706 -243.309 
BONUS  511.927 278.312 828.208 
 
501.382 278.312 831.732 
 
621.120 259.375 844.093 
 
-119.738 18.937 
INEQUITY 1 0.581 0.601 0.132 
 
0.579 0.598 0.132 
 
0.566 0.609 0.182 
 
0.013 -0.011 
INEQUITY 2   0.652 0.668 0.122    0.651 0.661 0.125   0.635 0.667 0.179   0.016 -0.006 
  (n = 145)       (n = 129)       (n = 16)           
INEQUITY 3 0.520 0.612 0.307 
 
0.503 0.617 0.309 
 
0.657 0.711 0.241 
 
-0.154 -0.094 
INEQUITY 4  0.530 0.727 0.329 
 
0.577 0.716 0.332 
 
0.742 0.787 0.248 
 
-0.165 -0.071 
INEQUITY 5 0.513 0.625 0.306 
 
0.496 0.605 0.310 
 
0.657 0.711 0.240 
 
-0.161 -0.106 





***indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
        






Differences in size of governance and firm characteristics control variables between 
acquiring and target firms: 1996 – 2010. 
CEO AGE is defined as the current age of the CEO one year prior to the merger announcement date. 
TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their respective position based on year prior 
to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of common stock owned by the CEO one year 
prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO was 
listed as the board chairman one year prior to the announcement. SALARY is defined as the fiscal year 
dollar value of the base salary earned by the executive in question (in millions) BONUS is the fiscal year 
dollar value of bonus and/or cash compensation earned by the executive in question (in millions). 
INEQUITY 1 - 6 are the compensation inequity ratios CIi/(1 + CIi) as described further in Table I. MARKET 
CAP is firm's market capitalization (in millions) one year prior to announcement and is determined by the 
product of common shares outstanding and the year-end closing price of a firm's common stock. ASSETS 
is defined as the value of long-term total assets on a firm's balance sheet (in millions) one year prior to 
announcement. TOBIN'S Q is estimated as a firm's market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current 
liabilities divided by total assets one year prior to announcement. BLOCK TOTAL is defined as the total 
outside ownership of blockholders who own greater than five percent of a firm's common stock. 
BLOCKHOLDERS is the total amount of outside blockholders who own a firm's common stock.  
Panel A: Governance variables 














 in Medians 
CEO AGE 1.101** 1.000*  1.151** 1.000**  0.861 1.500 
TENURE 0.881*** 4.000**  1.241** 1.000**  3.197** 2.500 
OWNERSHIP  -0.890** -0.904***  -1.077** -0.876***  1.122 -0.803 
CHAIR 0.209*** 1.000***  0.111*** 0.000  0.206** 1.000* 
SALARY  350.010*** 377.410***  364.766*** 388.700***  209.725** 64.141** 
BONUS  938.465*** 421.689***  969.295*** 420.270***  749.248** 705.960** 
INEQUITY 1 0.030** 0.028**  0.017* 0.014  0.029** 0.025 
INEQUITY 2  0.016*** 0.025***  0.014** 0.032  0.035** 0.030 
INEQUITY 3 0.041*** 0.013  0.065** -0.005  -0.131** 0.000 
INEQUITY 4  0.12* 0.006  0.078** 0.017  -0.129** -0.099* 
INEQUITY 5 0.059*  0.000  0.081*** 0.007*  -0.123** -0.061 
INEQUITY 6  0.069** 0.013  0.080** 0.021**  -0.137** -0.013* 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 

















***  11,781.858*** 7,200.000 
TOBIN'S Q 0.371 -885.769  0.309 -0.121  0.579 0.558 
BLOCK TOTAL -0.331* -1.159***  -0.348*** -0.101*  -0.174*** -0.147 





***indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.    






Division of acquiring and target firm governance variables and abnormal returns by 
compensation inequity: 1996 - 2010 
INEQUITY 1 - 6 are the compensation inequity ratios CIi/(1 + CIi) as described further in Table I. CEO AGE is 
defined as the current age of the CEO one year prior to the merger announcement date. CHAIR is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO was listed as the board chairman one year prior to 
the announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of common stock owned by the CEO one year 
prior to the announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their 
respective position based on year prior to announcement. SALARY is defined as the fiscal year dollar value 
of the base salary earned by the executive in question. BONUS is the fiscal year dollar value of bonus 
and/or cash compensation earned by the executive in question. CAR [-15, -2], [-1, +1], and [+2, +15] are 
the cumulative abnormal return event windows using a value-weighted index and observation period of    
-125, -46 days prior to announcement.  
Panel A: Acquiring firm  
 










CEO AGE 55.840 53.187 2.653** 52.287 54.098 -1.811 
TENURE 6.750 6.960 -0.210 6.732 6.833 -0.101 
OWNERSHIP 1.673 3.060 -1.387**    1.561 2.989 -1.427** 
CHAIR 0.795 0.544 0.251*** 0.797 0.539 0.258*** 
CAR [-15, -2] 0.000 -0.022 0.022 -0.005 -0.006 0.001 
CAR [-1, +1] -0.016 -0.027 0.011 -0.019 -0.024 0.005 
CAR [+2, +15] -0.020 -0.014 -0.006 -0.049 -0.010 -0.039 
TOBIN Q 2.101 2.827 -0.726*** 2.246 2.594 -0.348 
BLOCKHOLDER TOTAL 1.897 1.277 0.620*** 1.771 1.510 0.261** 
BLOCKHOLDERS 0.167 0.117 0.050*** 0.155 0.139 0.016** 
Panel B: Target firm             
 
     Inequity 1__________ 
 











CEO AGE 54.843 52.373 2.470 54.221 53.005 1.216 
CHAIR 0.712 0.541 0.172** 0.708 0.451 0.257** 
CAR [-15, -2] 0.060 0.031 0.028 0.070 0.018 0.052* 
CAR [-1, +1] 0.231 0.331 -0.101 0.328 0.229 -0.099 
CAR [+2, +15] 0.493 0.143 0.350 0.048 0.144 -0.096 
TOBIN Q 2.016 1.855 -0.161 1.942 1.169 0.773 
BLOCKHOLDER TOTAL 2.656 2.435 -0.221 2.600 2.497 -0.103 





***indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 








Regressions of six different measures of acquiring CEO compensation inequities 
on control variables for target firms greater than one billion dollars in enterprise 
value who experienced a merger or tender offer: 1996 - 2010. 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the form: Inequity = B0t + B1Governance(t-1) + B2Controli(t-1).  The 
dependent variables for Models 1 – 6 are the compensation inequity ratios CIi/(1 + CIi) as described in 
Table I. CEO AGE is defined as the AGE of the CEO one year prior to the announcement date. TENURE 
is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their respective position based on year prior to 
announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of common stock owned by the CEO one year 
prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable that takes a one if the CEO is also the 
chairperson. PRICECHANGE is the change in the firm's common stock price two years before 
announcement. RECESSION is an indicator variable that takes a one if the announcement date falls within 
a year defined by the NBER as a recession. BLOCKHOLDERS is the total amount of outside blockholders 
who own a firm's common stock. BLOCKTOTAL is defined as the total outside ownership of blockholders 
who own greater than five percent of a firm's common stock. MARKETCAP is the determined as the 
natural log of the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price. ASSETS is defined 
as the value of long-term total assets on a firm’s balance sheet (in millions) one year prior to 
announcement. TOBIN Q is estimated as a firm's market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current 
liabilities divided by total assets one year prior to announcement.     
 
Inequity 1 ______________ 
 
     Inequity 2___________ _____ 
Variable Model 1  Model 2   Model 1  Model 2 




































































































































ASSETS   -0.106***    -0.010** 
   [-2.928]    [-2.415] 
TOBIN Q -0.001  -0.004  -0.001    -0.003 
































indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. t-statistics are listed in brackets.  







Regressions of six different measures of target CEO compensation inequities on 
control variables for target firms greater than one billion dollars in enterprise value 
who experienced a merger or tender offer: 1996 - 2010. 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the form: Inequity = B0t + B1Governance(t-1) + B2Controli(t-1). The 
dependent variables for Models 1 – 6 are the compensation inequity ratios CIi/(1 + CIi) as described in 
Table I. The dependent variable for Models 1- 6 is Inequity CEO AGE is defined as the AGE of the CEO 
one year prior to the announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in 
their respective position based on year prior to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of 
common stock owned by the CEO one year prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable 
that takes a one if the CEO is also the chairperson. PRICECHANGE is the change in the firm's common 
stock price two years before announcement. RECESSION is an indicator variable that takes a one if the 
announcement date falls within a year defined by the NBER as a recession. BLOCKHOLDERS is the total 
number of outside blockholders who own a firm's common stock. BLOCK TOTAL is defined as the total 
outside ownership of blockholders who own greater than five percent of a firm's common stock. 
MARKETCAP is the determined as the natural log of the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by 
the year-end price. TOBIN Q is estimated as a firm's market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current 
liabilities divided by total assets one year prior to announcement.    
 
Inequity 1______________       Inequity 2__________________ 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
























































































































TOBIN Q   0.005    0.004 






























***indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. t-statistics are listed in brackets.  
 








***indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. t-statistics are listed in brackets.  
Table VIII 
Regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns on excess 
compensation inequities and control variables for mergers and acquisitions greater 
than one billion dollars in enterprise value: 1996 - 2010. 
Ordinary least squares regressions of the form: ACAR(t, t + 1) = B0t + B1Abnormal(t-1) + B2Controli(t-1). 
ABNORMAL INEQUITY are the residual terms from Table VI. CEO AGE is the age of the CEO one year 
prior to the announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their 
respective position based on year prior to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of 
common stock owned by the CEO one year prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator 
variable that takes a one if the CEO is also the chairperson. MARKETCAP is the determined as the natural 
log of the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price. TOBIN Q is estimated as a 
firm's market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current liabilities divided by total assets one year 
prior to announcement. PCTSTOCK is the percentage of stock used to finance the transaction. PREMIUM 
is the defined one month offer premium prior to the announcement. COMPLETED is an indicator variable 
that takes a one if the merger is listed in SDC as successful. RECESSION is an indicator variable that takes 
a one if the announcement date falls within a year defined by the NBER as a recession.  
VARIABLE CAR [-15, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +15] 
























































































PREMIUM 0.000  0.000  0.000 










RECESSION  -0.014  -0.016  0.007 
 [-0.842]  [-1.227]  [0.352] 
ATTITUDE  -0.003  -0.009  -0.014 
 [-0.189]  [-0.651]  [-0.667] 
CONSTANT -0.039  -0.077  -0.053 


















Regression analysis of target cumulative abnormal returns on excess compensation 
inequities and control variables for mergers and acquisitions greater than one 
billion dollars in enterprise value: 1996 - 2010. 
Ordinary lest squares regressions of the form: CAR(t, t + 1) = B0t + B1Abnormal(t-1) + B2Controli(t-1). 
ABNORMAL INEQUITY are the residual terms from Table VI. CEO AGE is the age of the CEO one year 
prior to the announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their 
respective position based on year prior to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of 
common stock owned by the CEO one year prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator 
variable that takes a one if the CEO is also the chairperson. MARKETCAP is the determined as the natural 
log of the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price. TOBIN Q is estimated as a 
firm's market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current liabilities divided by total assets one year 
prior to announcement. PCTSTOCK is the percentage of stock used to finance the transaction. PREMIUM 
is the defined one month offer premium prior to the announcement. COMPLETED is an indicator variable 
that takes a one if the merger is listed in SDC as successful. RECESSION is an indicator variable that takes 
a one if the announcement date falls within a year defined by the NBER as a recession. 
VARIABLE CAR [-15, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +15] 
























































































PREMIUM 0.001  0.004***  0.000 
 [1.459]  [3.905]  [0.605] 
COMPLETED   




   
[0.800] 
RECESSION -0.194**  -0.022  0.102 
 [-2.383]  [-0.139]  [0.985] 
ATTITUDE 0.077*  -0.127  0.092 
































indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
                  t-statistics are listed in brackets.  
  











Regression of offer premium on control variables for acquiring firms on inequity 
and governance, for mergers and acquisitions greater than one billion dollars in 
enterprise value: 1996 – 2010. 
Ordinary least squares regression of the form: Premium = B0t + B1Abnormal(t-1) + B2Controli(t-1). 
ABNORMAL INEQUITY is the error term from model 2 of Table VI. CEO AGE is the age of the CEO 
one year prior to the announcement date. TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in 
their respective position based on year prior to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of 
common stock owned by the CEO one year prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable 
that takes a one if the CEO is also the chairperson. MARKETCAP is the determined as the natural log of 
the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by the year-end price. TOBIN Q is estimated as a firm's 
market capitalization plus preferred stock plus current liabilities divided by total assets one year prior to 
announcement. ATTITUDE is an indicator variable that takes a one of the merger is listed in SDC as 
hostile or unsolicited.  




One Month   

































































TOBIN Q -0.379 
 
-0.632   0.186  
 [-0.345] 
 
[-0.601]   [0.158]  
























0.083  0.090  
OBSERVATIONS 239 
 







indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
t-statistics are listed in brackets.   











Logistic regression of tender offer likelihood on six different measures of 
compensation inequities and control variables for target firms greater than one 
billion dollars in enterprise value: 1996 - 2010.  




). ABNORMAL INEQUITY is the error term 
from model 2 of Table VII. CEO AGE is the age of the CEO one year prior to the announcement date. 
TENURE is defined as the length of time the CEO has been in their respective position based on year prior 
to announcement. OWNERSHIP represents the percentage of common stock owned by the CEO one year 
prior to the announcement date. CHAIR is an indicator variable that takes a one if the CEO is also the 
chairperson. MARKETCAP is the determined as the natural log of the firm’s common shares outstanding 
multiplied by the year-end price. TOBIN Q is estimated as a firm's market capitalization plus preferred 
stock plus current liabilities divided by total assets one year prior to announcement. RECESSION is an 
indicator variable that takes a one if the announcement date falls within a year defined by the NBER as a 
recession. OWNERSHIP is the percentage of common shares owned by the CEO one year prior to the 
announcement.    
VARIABLE Acquirer 
 
Target   









































 TOBIN Q 0.000 
 
0.224 













 OBSERVATIONS 212 
 







indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively. 
Standard errors are listed in brackets.  






Base Compensation of  for EMC Corporation, 1997 
 














Option Compensation of  for EMC Corporation, 1997 










Total Compensation of  for EMC Corporation, 2009 
  
 







Frequency distribution of mergers and acquisitions greater than one billion dollars in 
enterprise value: 1996 – 2010. 
  
  











Frequency distribution of compensation inequity for acquiring firm CEOs over the 
next highest paid executive: 1996 - 2010 
     
            




















 Figure VI 
Frequency distribution of compensation inequity for target firm CEOs over the next 
highest paid executive: 1996 - 2010 
  
                               
Compensation inequity 1 is listed on the horizontal axis. Normal curve is indicated by the purple line.  
